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JUROR ASSESSMENT OF CERTAINTY ABOUT FIREARMS 
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE 
Dr. Sarah L. Cooper* & Dr. Páraic Scanlon** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many firearms examiners believe they can reliably engage in individu-
alization, i.e., conclude that a particular gun fired a particular bullet to the 
“exclusion of all other[s] . . . .”1 Over the last century, to aid the determina-
tion of criminal liability, such conclusions have been routinely admitted into 
American courtrooms as expert evidence.2 
However, criticism about the ability of crime-solving forensic disci-
plines, including firearms/tool-mark identification, to engage in reliable in-
dividualization has grown throughout the 1990s and new millennium.3 This 
is largely due to the increasing sophistication and ability of DNA technology 
to identify both criminals and persons wrongly convicted.4 In particular, the 
National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) in its landmark 2009 report – 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 
(“Strengthening”) - concluded that “no forensic method [including firearms 
identification] has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistent-
ly, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between 
evidence and a specific individual or source”5 except for DNA analysis.6 
 
* Reader in Law; Director, Centre for Law, Science and Policy at Birmingham City Universi-
ty, School of Law, UK. 
** Lecturer in Developmental Psychology, Birmingham City University, School of Social 
Sciences, Department of Psychology, UK. 
The authors would like to thank undergraduate psychology student, Lily Edwards, for her 
excellent research assistance. 
 
 1. Adina Schwartz, Challenging Firearms and Toolmark Identification—Part One, 32 
CHAMPION 14, Oct. 2008. 
 2. Paul C. Giannelli, Edward J. Imwinkelried, & Joseph L. Peterson, Reference Guide 
on Forensic Identification Expertise, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 55, 91 
(3rd ed. 2011). (“The technique subsequently [after the 1920’s] gained widespread judicial 
acceptance and was not seriously challenged until recently.”). 
 3. Eadaoin O’Brien et al., Science in the Court: Pitfalls, Challenges and Solutions, 370 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 1674, 1 (2015). 
 4. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 8 (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING]. 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. Id. 
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Although challenged by some stakeholders,7 concerns raised in Strengthen-
ing have been respectively echoed and followed up by the President’s Coun-
cil of Advisors on Science and Technology8 (“PCAST”) and the National 
Commission on Forensic Science (“NCFS”).9 
Some American courts have acknowledged the existence of scientific 
uncertainty in the context of firearms individualization evidence since 
2005.10 To address this uncertainty, these courts have restricted expert testi-
mony; instructing experts to not testify in absolute terms, such as “there is 
an exact match,” but rather in allegedly more diluted terms, such as a match 
can be made “more likely than not” and “to a reasonable degree of certain-
ty.”11 Jurors must determine the weight of such evidence in criminal trials.12 
Research indicates various challenges can arise when jurors assess scientific 
evidence, including that jurors often lack scientific expertise; find comfort in 
alleged expert certainty; and can be confused by phrases such as “to a rea-
sonable degree of certainty.”13 
It is therefore important to further investigate the levels of certainty ju-
rors attach to common expert phrases. To do this, the authors conducted a 
study examining the effect of twelve expert statements of certainty on poten-
tial jurors.14 Results from a sample of 107 participants found a significant 
main effect for certainty, suggesting that participant certainty was influ-
enced by expert testimony.15 There was a general trend of significant find-
ings, with increased expert certainty leading to increased participant certain-
ty, with some notable exceptions.16 
 
 7. See infra Part I(B). 
 8. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS (2016) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT]. 
 9. See generally National Commission on Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/ncfs (last visited May 17, 2017). Note the NCFS’ charter expired on 
April 23, 2017. 
 10. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005); United 
States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. Monteiro, 407 F. 
Supp. 2d. 351 (2006). 
 11. See infra Part I(C). 
 12. Sarah Lucy Cooper, Forensic Identification Evidence: Tensions Between Law and 
Science, 16 J. PHIL. SCI. & L. 1, 21 (2016), http://jpsl.org/files/7814/6014/5245/ForensicScie
nceIdentification.pdf. (“Jurors play a pivotal role in assessing the reliability and weight of 
scientific evidence.”). 
 13. Id. at 13–14. See also Bonnie Lanigan, Firearms Identification: The Need for a 
Critical Approach to, and Possible Guidelines for, the Admissibility of “Ballistics” Evidence, 
17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 54, 71 (2012). 
 14. See infra Appendix A for t-tests data. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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This article contextualizes and presents the method and findings of our 
study in order to contribute to multi-disciplinary efforts nationwide to gen-
erate more knowledge about juror interpretation of expert forensic science 
evidence. Part II provides an overview of the process of firearms identifica-
tion; debates concerning its validity; and court approaches to addressing 
scientific uncertainty in the discipline.17 Part III explores current literature 
concerning juror interpretation of expert evidence.18 Part IV discusses the 
methods and findings of the authors’ study; comments on how the study’s 
findings might inform current judicial approaches; and outlines the authors’ 
recommendations for furthering this research topic.19 
II. CONTEXTUALIZING THE AUTHORS’ STUDY 
This section sets out the process of firearms identification, recent de-
bates about the validity of the discipline, and court approaches to legal chal-
lenges to the admissibility of firearms identification evidence. 
A. The Process of Firearms Identification 
When the hard metal of an internal part of a firearm connects with the 
softer metal of the ammunition, it makes a tool-mark on the ammunition.20 
Two distinct types of tool-marks may be created: striations and impres-
sions.21 Striations are similar to small scratches, and are most often produced 
on the bullet as it passes through the gun barrel.22 Impressions usually re-
semble dimples or craters, and are typically produced on the cartridge as it 
comes into contact with the various internal parts of the firing chamber (e.g. 
the firing pin, breach face, extractor, and ejector).23 Tool-marks can be di-
vided into class, subclass, and individual characteristics.24 Class characteris-
tics result from design factors and are determined prior to manufacture,25 
which means they are “distinctively designed features” and will be present 
on every tool in that class.26 By contrast, individual characteristics are 
unique to a particular tool and consist of purportedly random, microscopic 
imperfections and irregularities present on the tool’s surface.27 Subclass 
 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 10, 12. 
 21. Id. at 12. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 12. 
 27. Id. 
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characteristics straddle the line between class and individual characteris-
tics.28 Subclass characteristics arise when manufacturing processes create 
batches of tools that are similar to each other but distinct from other tools of 
the same class.29 
To evaluate whether a suspect firearm fired suspect ammunition, exam-
iners visually compare tool-marks present on suspect ammunition to those 
present on test ammunition fired by the suspect weapon.30 For more than 
eighty years, examiners have primarily used the comparison microscope to 
undertake this evaluation.31 Nowadays, their work can also be supported by 
ballistics imaging technology and national databases, such as the National 
Integrated Ballistic Information Network (“NIBIN”).32 
Through applying these methods many examiners believe they can 
make reliable conclusions about identification, including individualization. 
In 1998, the Association of Firearms and Tool Mark Examiners (“AFTE”), 
the leading professional organization in this field, developed a protocol 
(“AFTE Protocol”) detailing when an examiner may reach a certain conclu-
sion.33 Under the AFTE Protocol, an examiner may make one of four con-
clusions: (1) identification; (2) inconclusive; (3) elimination; or (4) unsuita-
ble for comparison.34 
To make an “identification” (i.e., a “match”), there must be “sufficient 
agreement” between the tool-marks subject to examination.35 Under AFTE’s 
Theory of Identification, which was adopted in 1992, “sufficient agreement” 
relates “to the significant duplication of random toolmarks”36 as evidenced 
by “the correspondence of a pattern or combination of patterns of surface 
contours.”37 An agreement is considered significant “when the agreement in 
individual characteristics exceeds the best agreement demonstrated between 
toolmarks known to have been produced by different tools and is consistent 
 
 28. See Id. (stating that subclass characteristics differ from individual characteristics 
because they are shared by more than one tool, but they cannot fall under class characteristics 
because every tool in that class does not share them). 
 29. Id. 
 30. STRENGTHENING, supra note 4, at 152–53. 
 31. ROBERT M. THOMPSON, FIREARMS IDENTIFICATION IN THE FORENSIC SCIENCE 
LABORATORY 8 (2010), http://ndaa.org/pdf/Firearms_identity_NDAAsm.pdf. 
 32. Id. at 29–30 (summarizing NIBIN). See generally National Integrated Ballistic 
Information Network (NIBIN), BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES, 
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/national-integrated-ballistic-information-network-nibin (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2018). 
 33. Ass’n of Firearms & Tool Mark Exam’rs, Theory of Identification as It Relates to 
Toolmarks, 30(1) ASS’N FIREARMS & TOOL MARK EXAM’RS J., 86 (1998). 
 34. Id. at 86–87. 
 35. AFTE Theory of Identification, ASS’N OF FIREARMS & TOOL MARK EXAM’RS, 
https://afte.org/about-us/what-is-afte/afte-theory-of-identification (last visited May 17, 2017). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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with agreement demonstrated by toolmarks known to have been produced 
by the same tool.”38 A conclusion that there is “sufficient agreement” be-
tween two toolmarks “means that the agreement of individual characteristics 
is of a quantity and quality that the likelihood another tool could have made 
the mark is so remote as to be considered a practical impossibility.”39 The 
theory states that the interpretation of identifications is subjective but 
“founded on scientific principles and based on the examiner’s training and 
experience.”40 
B. Current Debates About Validity 
Over the last three decades in particular, forensic disciplines such as 
firearms identification have been subject to growing criticism.41 Unreliable 
forensic science evidence is now a proven cause of wrongful conviction, 
with nearly half of the wrongful convictions associated with all 356 post-
conviction DNA exonerations being attributable, in some way, to such evi-
dence.42 These cases have underscored criticism that “little systematic re-
search has been conducted to validate the [forensic science] field’s basic 
premises and techniques. . . .”43 
Such criticism has underpinned national level concern about firearms 
identification evidence. In 2008, the National Research Council of the Na-
tional Academies published its Ballistic Imaging Report,44 and although the 
report was not intended to be an overall assessment of the firearms identifi-
cation discipline, the report found the validity of the fundamental assump-
tions of uniqueness and reproducibility of firearms-related tool-marks had 
not yet been fully demonstrated.45 The Committee took the view that a sig-
nificant amount of research would be needed to scientifically determine the 
degree to which firearms-related tool-marks are unique, or even to qualita-
tively characterize the probability of uniqueness.46 
Strengthening, which examined past, current, and the future use of fo-
rensic science in the United States, further cemented these views in 2009. 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., O’Brien et al., supra note 3. 
 42. See Misapplication of Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://
www.innocenceproject.org/causes/misapplication-forensic-science/ (last visited May 04, 
2018). 
 43. Paul C. Giannelli, Commentary, Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases, 33 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 103, 112 (2001). 
 44. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BALLISTIC IMAGING 3 (Daniel L. Cork et al. eds., 2008). 
 45. See United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175–1176 (D.N.M. 2009) (dis-
cussing the focus and scope of Ballistic Imaging). 
 46. Id. 
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Strengthening concluded that class characteristics can be “helpful in narrow-
ing the pool of tools that may have left a distinctive mark”47 and that indi-
vidual characteristics “might, in some cases, be distinctive enough to sug-
gest one particular source.”48 It also commented, however, that the AFTE 
Protocol was not defined in a sufficiently precise way for examiners to fol-
low, particularly in relation to when an examiner can conclude a “match.”49 
The AFTE Protocol was limited because it “does not even consider, let 
alone address, questions regarding variability, reliability, repeatability, or 
the number of correlations needed to achieve a given degree of confi-
dence.”50 Overall, Strengthening concluded “the scientific knowledge base 
for toolmark and firearms analysis is fairly limited,”51 and in order to make 
the process of individualization more precise and repeatable “additional 
studies should be performed.”52 Strengthening did not comment specifically 
on the admissibility of such evidence. 
In 2016, President Obama’s PCAST published a report, Forensic Sci-
ence in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-
Comparison Methods, in response to questions raised by President Obama 
post-Strengthening. President Obama wanted to know if additional steps 
remained to be taken to help “ensure the validity of forensic evidence used 
in the Nation’s legal system.”53 PCAST concluded that two important gaps 
remain, namely (1) a need for clarity about the scientific standards for the 
validity and reliability of forensic methods and (2) a need to evaluate specif-
ic forensic methods (including firearms identification) to determine whether 
their validity and reliability has been scientifically established.54 With regard 
to firearms identification, PCAST stated its conclusions were “consistent” 
with those in Strengthening,55 and that only one appropriate black box study 
had been undertaken.56 On the question of admissibility, PCAST stated that 
the decision “belongs to the courts,”57 but “[i]f firearms analysis is allowed 
in court, the scientific criteria for validity as applied should be understood to 
require clearly reporting the error rates seen in the one appropriately de-
signed black-box study. Claims of higher accuracy are not scientifically 
 
 47. STRENGTHENING, supra note 4, at 154. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 155. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 154. 
 53. PCAST REPORT, supra note 8, at 1. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 11. 
 56. Id. (showing estimated error-rates could be as high as 1 in 46). 
 57. Id at 12. 
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justified at present.”58 PCAST made a number of recommendations to judg-
es in this vein.59 
Although stakeholders largely share the vision that there is a need to 
continually enhance forensic science, they do not equally share concerns 
about the validity of firearms identification evidence. For example, in 2009, 
post-Strengthening, FBI employees specializing in firearms and tool-marks 
published views that the discipline is both “highly valuable and highly relia-
ble in its traditional methods.”60 Other groups have challenged the findings 
in Strengthening, including AFTE.61 More recently, AFTE has responded 
critically to the PCAST Report, expressing its “disappointment” that the 
report ignored research indicating “firearm and toolmark identification is 
scientifically valid,”62 and that if the AFTE Theory is applied properly, “ex-
aminers are able to conduct quality, accurate analysis.”63 Indeed, a number 
of studies have highlighted reliability in the field.64 The FBI, Department of 
Justice, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF) have also expressed “disappointment” with the PCAST Report.65 
They strongly disagree with the report’s recommendations “regarding the 
admission of forensic evidence in criminal trials, particularly with respect to 
firmly established firearm and tool mark forensic evidence.”66 ATF summa-
rized, 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. PCAST REPORT, supra note 8, at 19. 
 60. See Stephen G. Bunch et al., Is a Match Really a Match? A Primer on the Proce-
dures and Validity of Firearm and Toolmark Identification, FBI (July 2009), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-
communications/fsc/july2009/review/2009_07_review01.htm. 
 61. See AFTE Committee for the Advancement of the Science of Firearm and Tool 
Mark Identification, The Response of the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners 
to the February 2009 National Academy of Science Report “Strengthening Forensic Science 
in the United States: A Path Forward,” 41 ASS’N FIREARMS & TOOL MARK EXAM’RS J. 204, 
205 (2009), https://afte.org/uploads/documents/position-nas-2009.pdf (“There is an extensive 
body of research, extending back over one hundred years, which establishes the accuracy, 
reliability, and validity of conclusions rendered in the field of firearm and toolmark identifi-
cation.”). 
 62. See Response to the PCAST Report on Forensic Science, ASS’N OF FIREARMS & 
TOOL MARK EXAM’RS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://afte.org/uploads/documents/AFTE-PCAST-
Response.pdf. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See generally studies referred to in Sarah Lucy Cooper, Firearms Identification 
Evidence: Emerging Themes from Recent Criticism, Research and Case Law, in FORENSIC 
REFORM: PROTECTING THE INNOCENT 174 (Wendy J. Kohen & C. Michael Bowers eds., 
2017). 
 65. See ATF’s Response to the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technol-
ogy Report, INT’L ASS’N FOR IDENTIFICATION 1 (Sept. 21, 2016), 
https://www.theiai.org/president/20160921_ATF_PCAST_Response.pdf. 
 66. Id. 
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With respect to PCAST’s recommendation that courts should restrict the 
admission of firearm and tool mark evidence, ATF strongly agrees with 
the DOJ decision not to adopt that recommendation as the existing legal 
standards regarding the admissibility of firearm and tool mark evidence 
are based on sound science and sound legal reasoning. Decades of legal 
precedent—and the underlying scientific research on which the courts 
have relied—establish that forensic firearm and tool mark evidence is 
both reliable and of substantial value to juries in determining the facts. 
Firearm and tool mark evidence not only aids prosecutors and defense at-
torneys in the courtroom, it also enhances public safety and protects the 
innocent by providing law enforcement with science-based tools to focus 
scarce investigative resources on actual perpetrators.67 
Notably, the NCFS, established in 2013 following recommendations in 
Strengthening, has adopted a number of recommendations related to advanc-
ing scientific inquiry and research across forensic science, including how 
forensic science evidence is reported and testified about in court.68 The De-
partment of Justice is also in the process of developing guidance documents 
governing the testimony and reports of its forensic experts.69 To date, no 
uniform testimony guidelines have been provided in relation to firearms 
identification.70 
C. Court Responses 
The disagreement amongst stakeholders described in Part II(B) natural-
ly demonstrates that a level of uncertainty exists about firearms identifica-
tion evidence. Although firearms identification evidence has routinely satis-
fied the leading legal standards for admissibility in America for nearly a 
century,71 lawyers have recently used this uncertainty to challenge the ad-
missibility of firearms identification evidence in criminal cases.72 This sec-
tion presents a cohort of such cases from which the authors selected expert 
statements to use in their study. 
In response, some courts have restricted expert testimony to account 
for the alleged uncertainty. These courts have taken various approaches. 
Some courts have required examiners to describe their observations. For 
example, in United States v. Green,73 the state sought to admit expert testi-
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Reporting and Testimony, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/
reporting-and-testimony (last updated Nov. 6, 2017). 
 69. See Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/
forensic-science (last visited May 17, 2017). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally Cooper, supra note 64. 
 72. Id. 
 73. United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005). 
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mony that Green’s pistol could be matched, “to the exclusion of every other 
firearm in the world.”74 The court prevented this conclusion, permitting the 
examiner to only “describe and explain the ways in which the earlier casings 
are similar to the shell casings test-fired from the . . . pistol.”75 
Other courts have required examiners to testify to degrees of certainty. 
In United States v. Diaz,76 the court allowed the firearms examiner to testify 
to “a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.”77 This language was also per-
mitted in Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang.78 Similarly, in United States v. 
Taylor,79 the court restricted the examiner to testifying that the ammunition 
came from Taylor’s rifle to within a “reasonable degree of certainty in the 
firearms examination field.”80 In United States v. Otero,81 the court found 
testimony to a “reasonable degree of professional certainty” was permissi-
ble.82 A slightly different approach emerged in United States v. Glynn,83 
where the court limited the examiner, inter alia, to testifying that “a firearms 
match was ‘more likely than not.’”84 
On the other hand, some courts have continued to allow testimony that 
conveys absolute conclusions. For instance, in United States v. Natson,85 a 
court sanctioned testimony from a firearms examiner that the tool-marks 
present on a suspect cartridge “was fired” by Natson’s gun. In United States 
v. Melcher,86 the trial court ordered that the expert should not testify that he 
was “one hundred percent” sure, but the expert did, in fact, state that the 
“‘chances of another firearm creating [the] exact same pattern are so remote 
to be considered practically impossible.’”87 The appellate court acknowl-
edged that the expert had come “close to the line” of expressing one hundred 
percent certainty, but nonetheless rejected the appeal.88 In United States v. 
Mouzone,89 the expert was ordered not to testify that it was a practical im-
possibility for different firearms to have fired the suspect casings or that he 
 
 74. Id. at 107. 
 75. Id. at 108–09. 
 76. United States v. Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 WL 485967 at *11–14. 
 77. Id. at *11. 
 78. Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 458 Mass. 827, 848–851, 942 N.E.2d 927, 945–948 
(Mass. 2011). 
 79. United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1180 (D.N.M. 2009). 
 80. Id. 
 81. United States v. Otero, 849 F. Supp. 2d 425, 429 (D.N.J. 2012). 
 82. Id. 
 83. United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 84. Id. at 575. 
 85. United States v. Natson, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Ga. 2007). 
 86. United States v. Melcher, No. 12-0544 WHO (PR), 2014 WL 31359, at *12 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 3, 2014). 
 87. Id. at *12. 
 88. Id. at *13. 
 89. United States v. Mouzone, 687 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir. 2012). 
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was certain about his conclusions.90 At trial, however, the expert repeatedly 
testified that the casings found at two different murder scenes were “‘fired 
from the same firearm.’”91 Mouzone appealed on this point.92 Like in 
Melcher, however, the appellate court rejected the appeal.93 
The authors used these cases (and the AFTE Theory of Identification) 
to generate and select expert statements for their study. The practical impact 
of such statements in a courtroom is important to investigate. This is be-
cause jurors must determine the weight of such evidence in criminal trials, 
and research indicates that various challenges can arise when jurors assess 
scientific evidence. Part III discusses associated literature and the authors’ 
study. 
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND JUROR ASSESSMENT OF CERTAINTY: EXISTING 
LITERATURE AND RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
Jurors in criminal cases can encounter various obstacles, both of a per-
sonal and institutional nature, when assessing scientific evidence.94 Given 
the crucial role jurors and forensic science evidence play in the criminal 
justice system, research examining this issue is important. As the NAS stat-
ed in Strengthening, 
Jurors’ use and comprehension of forensic evidence is not well studied. 
Better understanding is needed in this area, and recommendations are 
needed for programs or methods that will better prepare juries in appro-
priate, unbiased ways for trials in which scientific evidence is expected 
to play a large or pivotal role.95 
This section explores existing literature on this topic and presents the 
method and findings of the authors’ study against this backdrop. 
A. Existing Literature 
Examining juror certainty based on expert testimony is a complex pro-
cess because of the context-dependant nature of the field.96 Participant as-
sessment of the credibility of experts has been extensively studied, both 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 217. 
 94. See generally Cooper, supra note 12; Cooper, supra note 64. 
 95. STRENGTHENING, supra note 4, at 237. 
 96. Saks, M.J., Risinger, D.M., Rosenthal, R. & Thompson, W.C., Context Effects in 
Forensic Science: A Review and Application of the Science of Science to Crime Laboratory 
Practice in the United States, SCI. & JUST., 43, 77–90 (2003). 
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generally97 and specifically in courtrooms.98 Recent studies continue to re-
flect the complexity of the area. In 2015, Blackwell and Seymour concluded 
that jurors rank relevant professional experience, lack of bias, and clarity of 
evidence in order of importance.99 Confidence, eye-contact and academic 
qualifications are ranked as less important.100 In 2015, Thompson and New-
man found that perceptions of both DNA and shoeprint evidence are modi-
fied by prior expectation and belief as well as the content of the evidence 
itself.101 Studies have also shown that some expert witnesses are prepared 
for testimony by trial consultants, to increase the credibility and believabil-
ity of their evidence.102 This level of context makes examining the content of 
any expert statements, including statements about firearms identification 
evidence, challenging. 
Koehler and Ritchie attempted to remove much of the context while 
examining expert statements (about DNA evidence) of numerical certainty 
using simplified experimental designs.103 These studies suggest that exclu-
sion percentages104 are more likely to result in conviction than if an expert 
were to testify in terms of frequency ratios.105 However, the case law de-
scribed in Part II(C) shows that forensic experts, specifically firearms exam-
iners, can and often do testify using solely linguistic or ordinal category-
based evidence.106 Naturally, any verbal certainty judgements, made without 
explicit statistical information, are a balance between the meaning of a 
 
 97. See generally Chanthika Pornpitakpan, The Persuasiveness of Source Credibility: A 
Critical Review of Five Decades’ Evidence, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 243 (2004). 
 98. See generally Stanley L. Brodsky, Michael P. Griffin, & Robert J. Cramer, The 
Witness Credibility Scale: An Outcome Measure for Expert Witness Research, 28 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L., 892 (2010). 
 99. Suzanne Blackwell & Fred Seymour, Expert Evidence and Jurors’ Views on Expert 
Witnesses, 22 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 673, 678 (2015). 
 100. Id. 
 101. William C. Thompson & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of Forensic Statis-
tics: Evaluation of Random Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal Equivalents, 
39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 332, 332 (2015). 
 102. Robert J. Cramer, et al., A Confidence-Credibility Model of Expert Witness Persua-
sion: Mediating Effects & Implications for Trial Consultation, CONSULTING PSYCHOL. J: 
PRAC. & RES. 129, 130 (2011). 
 103. See generally Johnathan J. Koehler, The Psychology of Numbers in the Courtroom: 
How to Make DNA Match Statistics Seem Impressive or Insufficient, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275 
(2001); see generally J. Ritchie, Probabilistic DNA Evidence: The Layperson’s Interpreta-
tion, 47 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI., 440 (2015). 
 104. For example, a statement such as “the probability that the suspect would match the 
blood specimen if he wasn’t the source is 0.1%.” 
 105. For example, a statement such as “the frequency that the suspect would match the 
blood specimen if he wasn’t the source is 1 in 1000.” 
 106. Evidence that suggests a fixed hierarchy, but the numerical difference between the 
categories is not fixed, for example, statements such as “likely,” “very likely,” and “extreme-
ly likely.” 
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phrase given by the expert and the interpreter’s own subjective understand-
ing of the evidence.107 
The inherent problem with these ordinal statements has been the focus 
of some examination. Krauss and Sales108 manipulated the type of expert 
testimony (clinical versus actuarial), finding that participants were more 
influenced by the qualitative, linguistic evidence.109 Martire et al found that 
inculpatory evidence was significantly more likely to be seen as weak if it 
was presented in terms of linguistic descriptions than in terms of numerical 
likelihood.110 Despite the Association of Forensic Science Providers guide-
lines suggesting forensic experts use likelihood ratios, uptake has varied 
between disciplines and jurisdictions.111 
In 2008, McQuiston-Surrett and Saks asked participants to rate an 
odontology expert’s intended certainty, on a scale from zero to one hundred, 
from four phrases taken from American Board of Forensic Odontology 
(ABFO) guidelines.112 Responses showed that participant estimates did not 
mirror the intended hierarchy.113 For example, the use of the term “a match” 
was assumed by ABFO to mean “No expression of specificity intended; gen-
erally similar but true for large percentage of population,” but was rated as 
the most certain statement (86/100) by participants, ahead of “consistent 
with” (75) another statement assumed to be uncertain, and significantly 
above both more certain phrases – “probable” (57) and “reasonable scien-
tific certainty” (70).114 The researchers concluded that expert witnesses can-
not merely create a definition for a term and expect judges and juries to un-
derstand what they mean.115 
 
 107. Thomas S. Wallsten, Samuel Fillenbaum, & James A. Cox, Base Rate Effects on the 
Interpretations of Probability and Frequency Expressions, J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 571 
(1986). 
 108. Daniel A. Kraus & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert 
Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 
267, 276–77 (2001). 
 109. Id. Clinical meaning expert testimony based on personal experience of the subject; 
and actuarial meaning a numerically-based risk factor taken from research on large groups of 
people. 
 110. Kristy A. Martire et al., The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain Forensic 
Science Evidence: Verbal Equivalence, Evidence Strength, and the Weak Evidence Effect, 37 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 197, 200 (2013). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Dawn McQuiston-Surrett, & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion Evidence in 
the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 1159 (2008). 
 113. Id. at 1162–63. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1163. 
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McQuiston-Surrett and Saks followed up this study with an examina-
tion of certainty statements in microscopic hair evidence.116 They examined 
both potential jurors and judicial participants, including a comparison be-
tween two subjective qualitative statements – “match” and “similar in all 
microscopic characteristics,” and three quantitative statements – “objective 
single-probability,” “subjective probability,” and “objective multiple-
frequency.”117 They found that the qualitative statements were deemed sig-
nificantly more certain than the subjective probability or objective multiple-
frequency statements.118 Non-judicial participants were particularly suscep-
tible to this effect.119 Unlike in their 2008 study, they did not find a signifi-
cant difference between the two qualitative statements, with both scoring 
around seventy-nine on a zero to one hundred scale.120 Based on these stud-
ies, they concluded that empirical testing of the responses to the relevant 
words and phrases is needed, and that a simple approach would be best.121 
Understanding more about juror interpretation of qualitative, language-
based evidence is particularly important. This is because studies suggest that 
expert testimony couched in absolute terms may sensitize or inure potential 
jury members to evidence, resulting in higher certainty judgments because 
such testimony is considered to clarify an otherwise ‘grey’ situation.122 Ju-
rors have been found to show a lack of skill in distinguishing between evi-
dence-based findings and flawed science.123 Jurors’ understanding of inter-
nal validity difficulties in expert evidence, such as the robustness of meth-
ods used by experts, has also been shown to be flawed.124 The conclusion 
was that there is a need to examine the effectiveness of traditional legal 
safeguards against unfounded, seemingly-scientific testimony.125 In fact, in 
general, it has been found that participants in a range of experimental situa-
 
 116. Dawn McQuiston-Surrett, & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic Identifica-
tion Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV, 
436–453 (2009). 
 117. Id. at 437–438. 
 118. Id. at 444. 
 119. Id. at 445. 
 120. Id. at 443. 
 121. Id; McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 112, at 1163. 
 122. Nancy Brekke & Eugene Borgida, Expert Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials: 
A Social-Cognitive Analysis, 55(3) J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 372, 383 (1988); Mar-
garet Bell Kovera et al., Does Expert Psychological Testimony Inform or Influence Juror 
Decision Making? A Social Cognitive Analysis, 82(1) J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 178, 188 (1997). 
 123. Bradley D. McAuliff & Margaret Bell Kovera, Juror Need for Cognition and Sensi-
tivity to Methodological Flaws in Expert Evidence, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 385 (2008). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Bradley D. McAuliff & Tejah D. Duckworth, I Spy with My Little Eye: Jurors’ De-
tection of Internal Validity Threats in Expert Evidence, 34(6) L. & HUM. BEHAV, 489, 499 
(2010). 
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tions are often poor at assessing their own understanding of information and 
their own decision-making processes.126 
This existing literature suggests that qualitative, language-based expert 
testimony, including that outlined in Part II(C),127 is poorly understood by 
the juror pool, but simultaneously viewed as powerful and compelling by 
those same participants. This is a concerning combination of findings, 
meaning further understanding of these statements and their hierarchies is 
vital moving forward. The authors’ study aimed to contribute to this need in 
the context of firearms identification evidence. Sub-section B outlines our 
rationale, methods, and findings. 
B. Rationale 
While individualization of firearms identification evidence has the sup-
port of some scientific findings,128 a number of studies contest whether these 
underpinnings amount to sufficiently powerful evidence for definitive 
statements of certainty by experts.129 Some United States courts have 
acknowledged this issue, as outlined in Part II(C).130 These courts have re-
stricted expert testimony; instructing experts to not testify in absolute terms, 
such as “there is an exact match,” but rather in allegedly more diluted terms, 
such as a match can be made “more likely than not” and “to a reasonable 
degree of certainty.” The reason the authors chose to focus on firearms iden-
tification evidence is because this pattern in judicial decision-making is par-
ticularly pronounced.131 Through such cases, an ordinal hierarchy of expert 
testimony has, in effect, been created, presuming that such statements would 
be ranked as less certain [than an exact match] by jurors. What is not 
known, however, are the numerical differences between these statements 
when jurors assess certainty. This is the area the authors’ study aimed to 
examine further. 
 
 126. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Elizabeth W. Dunn, Self-Knowledge: Its Limits, 
Value, and Potential for Improvement, 55 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 493, 504 (2004). 
 127. See supra Part II(C). 
 128. See, e.g., Ronald G. Nichols, Firearm and Toolmark Identification Criteria: A Re-
view of the Literature, Part II, 48(2) J. FORENSIC SCI. 318 (2003); Ronald G. Nichols, De-
fending the Scientific Foundations of the Firearms and Tool Mark Identification Discipline: 
Responding to Recent Challenges, 52(3) J. FORENSIC SCI. 586–93 (2007). 
 129. See Mark Page, Jane Taylor & Matt Blenkin, Forensic Identification Science Evi-
dence Since Daubert: Part II - Judicial Reasoning in Decisions to Exclude Forensic Identifi-
cation Evidence on Grounds of Reliability, 56(4) J. FORENSIC SCI. 913, 917 (2011). 
 130. See supra Part II(C). 
 131. See, e.g., Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court 
Responses to Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234, 287 (2013); Cooper, 
supra note 62, at 470 
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IV. METHODS, RESULTS, AND FINDINGS 
A. Methods 
Using an online questionnaire, participants were recruited through aca-
demic, professional, and community links across the United States. In total, 
107 participants were placed in the role of a juror in a criminal trial. Partici-
pants were told that a qualified firearms examiner, testifying for the state, 
had been asked to testify as to whether tool-marks produced on ammunition 
test-fired from the Defendant’s gun matched tool-marks present on suspect 
ammunition found at the crime scene. While appreciating the wider context 
in which jury decision-making occurs, the authors purposely designed such 
a basic scenario in order to remove as much context as possible and to there-
fore encourage participants to focus solely on the content of the expert 
statements. The authors also deliberately sought participants from across the 
general population. The only eligibility requirement was that participants be 
eligible for federal jury service, which was determined by participants an-
swering a number of closed-answer questions. 
Participants were provided twelve different expert statements in pseu-
do-random order. They were asked to rank their level of certainty, based on 
each statement, on a scale of zero to one hundred.132 The expert statements 
were chosen from statements referenced in case law, such as that outlined in 
Part II(C),133 and with reference to the AFTE Theory. The authors ordered 
the statements into a generally ordinal hierarchy of certainty. Three state-
ments were hypothesised to attract high-certainty and three low-certainty. 
The remaining seven statements were hypothesised to attract moderate lev-
els of certainty. 
The study simply sought to determine the statistical validity of the spe-
cific hierarchy of certainty. 
B. Findings 
The ordinal hierarchy was found to show a significant general trend in 
the expected direction. The following sub-sections present means and stand-
ard deviations for each statement; results that showed significant differences 
between statements; and a summary about the meaning and implications of 
our findings. 
 
 132. Zero being the least certain and one hundred being the most. 
 133. See supra Part II(C). 
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1. Means and Standard Deviations 
Table A shows the mean certainties, standard deviations, and signifi-
cant differences found for each expert statement. The Mean is the average 
score of certainty for each statement across participants. The Standard Devi-
ation is the average amount each individual participant varied away from 
that Mean. The larger the Standard Deviation, the wider spread the partici-
pants’ scores for certainty were for the relevant statement. A smaller Stand-
ard Deviation shows participants’ scores for the relevant statement are more 
clustered together. The size of the Standard Deviation is important because 
it impacts ‘significance’ as explained in sub-section (b)2 below. 
 
Table A: Mean Certainties, Standard Deviations, and Significant Dif-
ferences 







STATEMENTS HYPOTHESISED TO ATTRACT HIGH LEVELS OF 
CERTAINTY 
1 “There is a match to the exclu-
sion of every other firearm in 
the world.”  
68.94 35.12 9, 10, 11, 12 
2 “There is an exact match be-
tween the suspect ammunition 
and the ammunition test fired 
from the Defendant’s gun.”  
92.05 15.92 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
 
3 “The chances of another fire-
arm creating the exact same 
tool-marks are so remote as to 
be considered practically im-
possible.”  
77.96 28.95 1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
 
STATEMENTS HYPOTHESISED TO ATTRACT MODERATE LEVELS 
OF CERTAINTY 
4 “A match between suspect am-
munition and ammunition test-
fired from the defendant’s gun 
can be made to a practical cer-
tainty.”  
72.50 20.83 8, 9 10, 11,12 
5 “There is a match between sus-
pect ammunition and ammuni-
73.80 19.97 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
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tion test-fired from the defend-
ant’s gun to a reasonable degree 
of ballistic certainty.”  
6 “A match between suspect am-
munition and ammunition test-
fired from the defendant’s gun 
can be made to a reasonable 
degree of certainty in the ballis-
tics field.”  
74.79 17.91 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
7 “A match between suspect am-
munition and ammunition test-
fired from the defendant’s gun 
can be made to a reasonable 
degree of professional certain-
ty.”  
72.64 18.25 8, 9, 10, 11, 
12 
8 “A match between suspect am-
munition and ammunition test-
fired from the defendant’s gun 
can be made to a reasonable 
degree of certainty in the fire-
arms examination field.”  
66.59 21.57 9, 10, 11, 12 
9 “A match between suspect am-
munition and ammunition test-
fired from the defendant’s gun 
is more likely than not.”  
56.83 21.42 10, 11, 12 
STATEMENTS HYPOTHESISED TO ATTRACT LOW LEVELS OF 
CERTAINTY 
10 “The results of my examination 
of the ammunition test-fired 
from the Defendant’s gun and 
suspect ammunition are incon-
clusive.”  
22.75 30.90 1-9 
11 “There is significant disagree-
ment in discernible class char-
acteristics and individual char-
acteristics between the suspect 
ammunition and those test-fired 
by the Defendant’s gun.”  
28.43 29.93 1-9 
12 “The suspect ammunition is 
unsuitable for comparison with 
ammunition test-fired from the 
Defendant’s gun.”  
22.29 29.18 1-9 




Figure A: Means and Standard Deviation Ranges 
 
Figure A shows the Mean certainty for statements 1-12 (0-100) and the 





Figure A: Means and Standard Deviations for each of the statements 
 
The information from Table A and Figure A was statistically analyzed 
to consider whether significant differences existed between the statements 
and, therefore, whether the general ordinal hierarchy was valid. 
2. Significant Differences 
The authors undertook a statistical analysis that examined the Mean 
and Standard Deviation variance and compared it between statements. In 
short, if the Means (for each statement) are different and the Standard Devi-
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ations (within each statement) show there is a low level of variability in 
scores, the statements are significantly different. The further apart the 
Means are between each statement, the more likely it is that a significant 
difference will be produced. However, as Standard Deviation increases, sig-
nificance is less likely, as the scores are spread out more. A ‘significant dif-
ference’ means we can generalize our findings to the population our partici-
pant sample came from, in this case, the United States federal juror pool. 
We used an ANOVA (statistical Analysis of Variance) to see if there 
was an overall significant difference between the statements and found there 
was. We then used t-tests134 to compare each pair of statements separately 
for differences, one-on-one. This produced the results in Table B. 
 
Table B: Significant Differences Between Expert Statements135 
 
Number Expert Statement Expert Statement was found to 
elicit significantly more certainty 
than statements 
1 “There is a match to the exclusion of 
every other firearm in the world.”  
9, 10, 11 and 12. 
2 “There is an exact match between the 
suspect ammunition and the ammuni-
tion test fired from the Defendant’s 
gun.”  
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. 
 
3 “The chances of another firearm cre-
ating the exact same tool-marks are 
so remote as to be considered practi-
cally impossible.”  
1, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. 
 
4 “A match between suspect ammuni-
tion and ammunition test-fired from 
the defendant’s gun can be made to a 
practical certainty.”  
8, 9 10, 11, and 12. 
5 “There is a match between suspect 
ammunition and ammunition test-
fired from the defendant’s gun to a 
reasonable degree of ballistic certain-
ty.”  
8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. 
6 “A match between suspect ammuni-
tion and ammunition test-fired from 
the defendant’s gun can be made to a 
reasonable degree of certainty in the 
8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. 
 
 134. Sixty-six t tests were used. 
 135. See infra Appendix A for t-tests data. 
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ballistics field.”  
7 “A match between suspect ammuni-
tion and ammunition test-fired from 
the defendant’s gun can be made to a 
reasonable degree of professional 
certainty.”  
8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. 
8 “A match between suspect ammuni-
tion and ammunition test-fired from 
the defendant’s gun can be made to a 
reasonable degree of certainty in the 
firearms examination field.”  
9, 10, 11, and 12. 
9 “A match between suspect ammuni-
tion and ammunition test-fired from 
the defendant’s gun is more likely 
than not.”  
10, 11, and 12. 
10 “The results of my examination of 
the ammunition test-fired from the 
Defendant’s gun and suspect ammu-
nition are inconclusive.”  
N/A. 
11 “There is significant disagreement in 
discernible class characteristics and 
individual characteristics between 
the suspect ammunition and those 
test-fired by the Defendant’s gun.”  
N/A. 
12 “The suspect ammunition is unsuita-
ble for comparison with ammunition 
test-fired from the Defendant’s gun.”  
N/A. 
 
C. Summary and Implications of Findings 
The results show a general trend that the statements hypothesized as 
being high-certainty elicit significantly higher levels of certainty than those 
hypothesized as moderate-certainty statements and low-certainty statements. 
Moderate-certainty statements elicited higher levels of certainty than low-
certainty statements. In other words, the general ordinal hierarchy was found 
to show a significant general trend in the expected direction. 
The only exception to this trend was Statement 1 (“to the exclusion of 
every other firearm in the world”), which was found to elicit significantly 
less certainty than the other two high-certainty phrases, and no difference 
with all of the moderate-certainty phrases, except for Statement 9 (“more 
likely than not”) This is interesting given that the precise language of State-
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ment 1 suggests it was one of, if not the most, certain statement included in 
the study. As such, this finding warrants further investigation. Notably, 
Statement 3 (“practically impossible”) was only found to elicit more certain-
ty than two of the moderate-certainty statements, namely Statement 8 (“a 
reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms examination field) and State-
ment 9, and showed no significant difference with Statements 4, 5, 6, and 7. 
Statement 2 (“an exact match”) was found to elicit the highest level of cer-
tainty from participants, suggesting such language is particularly persuasive 
to jurors. This finding suggests that judicial findings that the admissibility of 
such evidence is harmless error or is not prejudicial are overlooking juror 
perceptions of such evidence; a point Cooper has raised previously.136 
With regards to the moderate-certainty statements, Statements 4 (“prac-
tical certainty”), 5 (“reasonable degree of ballistic certainty”), 6 (“reasona-
ble degree of certainty in the ballistics field”), and 7 (“a reasonable degree 
of professional certainty”) did not show any inter-statement differences. 
However, these statements did elicit more certainty from participants than 
Statements 8 (“a reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms examination 
field”) and 9 (“more likely than not”). This suggests that when experts con-
vey their conclusions in terms of “practical,” “professional,” and “ballistic” 
certainty, they are seen by participants as more certainty-inducing than when 
they convey their conclusions in terms of “firearms-related” certainty. Nota-
bly, Statement 8 was found to induce more certainty than Statement 9. 
Statement 9 only elicited more certainty than the low-certainty statements. 
As expected, all high-certainty and moderate-certainty statements induced 
more certainty in participants than the low certainty statements, namely 
Statements 10 (“inconclusive”), 11 (“significant disagreement”), and 12 
(“unsuitable for comparisons”). No significant differences were found be-
tween the three low-certainty phrases. All low-certainty statements generat-
ed some certainty in participants, including Statement 12, even though the 
statement conveyed that examined comparison could not take place. 
The authors’ findings with regard to the moderate-certainty statements 
are particularly important because these sorts of statements have been em-
ployed by the judiciary to address current uncertainty about firearms identi-
fication evidence. Our results suggest that the judiciary’s assumption that 
these moderate-certainty phrases convey less certainty (and will be inter-
preted as such by jurors) than language akin to individualization is valid. 
 
 136. Cooper, supra note 64, at 460 (“In relation to preventing frivolous claims from 
flooding the system, courts often conclude that the admission of such evidence was non-
prejudicial in light of other evidence against the defendant. In other words, courts are terming 
the legally sound or unsound admission of firearms-identification evidence as immaterial. 
However, this rationale arguably overlooks the high impact scientific evidence has on jurors 
and the difficulty they have in accurately evaluating scientific evidence.”). 
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However, there are a few points to note. First, our study suggests that 
moderate-certainty statements do still attract notable certainty scores (72.5–
74.8%) – they are not immaterial. Our results suggest that moderate-
certainty statements do still persuade jurors more towards determining that 
the relevant evidence is inculpatory. As such, stakeholders should consider 
that such statements will not necessarily detract jurors from findings of 
guilt. Again, our findings suggest that the judiciary should be mindful of 
rejecting challenges to firearms identification evidence on the basis that ad-
mitting such evidence (presented in moderate-certainty formats, as well as 
high-certainty formats) was non-prejudicial or harmless in light of other 
evidence against the defendant. 
Second, our results show that not all moderate-certainty statements are 
interpreted to convey similar levels of certainty by potential jurors. State-
ment 8 (66.6%) and Statement 9 (56.8%) induced significantly lower levels 
of certainty in participants than all other moderate-certainty phrases, which 
attracted certainty scores of 72.5–74.8%. As such, the judiciary should be 
mindful not to use all moderate-certainty statements as if they are synony-
mous in meaning. Consider the case of Melcher, for example. In rejecting 
Melcher’s appeal, the court commented that the difference between “practi-
cal certainty” and “considered practically impossible” versus “reasonable 
degree of certainty” or “more likely than not” would not tip the outcome of 
the case.137 Although our results support the notion that there is no signifi-
cant difference between the phrases “practical certainty,” “practical impos-
sibility,” and “reasonable degree of certainty,” they do suggest there is a 
significant difference between an expert using these three phrases and the 
phrase “more likely than not,” which, our study suggests, is viewed as sig-
nificantly less certain by jurors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Criticism about the ability of crime-solving forensic disciplines, includ-
ing firearms identification, to engage in valid individualization has grown 
throughout the 1990s and new millennium. Some American courts have 
acknowledged the existence of scientific uncertainty in the context of fire-
arms individualization evidence since 2005. To address this uncertainty, 
these courts have restricted expert testimony; instructing experts to not testi-
fy in absolute terms, such as “there is an exact match,” but rather in alleged-
ly more diluted terms, such as a match can be made “more likely than not” 
and “to a reasonable degree of certainty.”138 
 
 137. United States v. Melcher, No. 12-0544 WHO (PR), 2014 WL 31359, at *13 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 3, 2014). 
 138. See supra Part II(C) 
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In criminal trials, jurors must determine the weight of expert evidence, 
and, thus, must assess how much certainty to attach to these various expert 
phrases. Given that research suggests that jurors might find this task chal-
lenging, and the existence of a particularly pronounced pattern of such judi-
cial decision-making in firearms identification evidence cases, the authors 
conducted a study examining the effect of twelve expert statements of cer-
tainty, by a qualified firearms examiner, on potential jurors. Results from a 
sample of 107 participants found a significant main effect for certainty, sug-
gesting that participant certainty was influenced by expert testimony in an 
expected direction along an ordinal hierarchy. 
In the context of firearms identification evidence, the findings of the 
authors’ study add to the body of literature that has found jurors to be influ-
enced by qualitative, linguistic evidence, and that such evidence can elicit 
notable scores of certainty from jurors. Our results also affirm the findings 
of previous studies that expert testimony couched in absolute terms may 
particularly inure jurors to such evidence. In so doing, the authors’ study 
responds to calls from researchers and national organizations to further in-
vestigate jurors’ use and comprehension of certain words and phrases in-
volved in forensic expert testimony, and the study provides some evidence 
with which to move forward. 
On the basis of our findings, the authors echo the call for further re-
search in this area. In particular, the authors suggest further investigation of 
(1) ordinal hierarchies of expert language used in relation to other forensic 
science disciplines subject to similar criticisms as firearms identification 
evidence; (2) whether a more significant ordinal hierarchy exists in relation 
to the moderate-certainty statements identified in the context of firearms 
identification evidence; (3) further examination of very high certainty 
phrases; (4) whether adding context influences juror interpretation of cer-
tainty, and, thus, the established hierarchy, e.g. by highlighting the alleged 
limitations of firearms identification evidence; and (5) on what basis jurors 




Pair 11: Statement 1 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 12 (t[106] = 11.051, p = .000). 
Pair 12: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 3 (t[106] = 5.040, p = .000). 
Pair 13: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 4 (t[106] = 11.090, p = .000). 
Pair 14: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 5 (t[106] = 10.210, p = .000). 
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Pair 15: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 6 (t[106] = 8.638, p = .000). 
Pair 16: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 7 (t[106] = 11.425, p = .000). 
Pair 17: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 8 (t[106] = 11.549, p = .000). 
Pair 18: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 9 (t[106] = 13.005, p = .000). 
Pair 19: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 10 (t[106] = 19.05, p = .000). 
Pair 20: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 11 (t[106] = 17.943, p = .000). 
Pair 21: Statement 2 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 12 t(106) = 11.051, p<.000. 
Pair 26: Statement 3 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 8 (t[106] = 3.528, p = .001). 
Pair 27: Statement 3 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 9 (t[106] = 5.669, p = .000). 
Pair 28: Statement 3 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 10 (t[106] = 12.870, p = .000). 
Pair 29: Statement 3 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 11 (t[106] = 11.770, p = .000). 
Pair 30: Statement 3 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 12 (t[106] = 14.091, p = .000). 
Pair 34: Statement 4 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 8 (t[106] = 2.610, p = .010). 
Pair 35: Statement 4 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 9 (t[106] = 6.099, p = .000). 
Pair 36: Statement 4 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 10 (t[106] = 13.200, p = .000). 
Pair 37: Statement 4 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 11 (t[106] = 13.179, p = .000). 
Pair 38: Statement 4 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 12 (t[106] = 14.875, p = .000). 
Pair 41: Statement 5 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 8 (t[106] = 3.271, p < 0.001). 
Pair 42: Statement 5 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 9 (t[106] = 6.913, p < 0.001). 
Pair 43: Statement 5 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 10 (t[106] = 14.296, p < 0.001). 
Pair 44: Statement 5 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 11 (t[106] = 13.626, p < 0.001). 
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Pair 45: Statement 5 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 12 (t[106] = 15.641, p < 0.001). 
Pair 47: Statement 6 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 8 (t[106] = 3.587, p = 0.001). 
Pair 48: Statement 6 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 9 (t[106] = 7.873, p < 0.001). 
Pair 49: Statement 6 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 10 (t[106] = 16.196, p < 0.001). 
Pair 50: Statement 6 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 11 (t[106] = 14.793, p < 0.001). 
Pair 51: Statement 6 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 12 (t[106] = 17.066, p < 0.001). 
Pair 52: Statement 7 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 8 (t[106] = 3.279, p = 0.001). 
Pair 53: Statement 7 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 9 (t[106] = 6.690, p < 0.001). 
Pair 54: Statement 7 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 10 (t[106] = 13.740, p < 0.001). 
Pair 55: Statement 7 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 11 (t[106] = 13.368, p < 0.001). 
Pair 56: Statement 7 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 12 (t[106] = 16.138, p < 0.001). 
Pair 57: Statement 8 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 9 (t[106] = 3.915, p < 0.001). 
Pair 58: Statement 8 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 10 (t[106] = 12.609, p < 0.001). 
Pair 59: Statement 8 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 11 (t[106] = 10.804, p < 0.001). 
Pair 60: Statement 8 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 12 (t[106] = 13.724, p < 0.001). 
Pair 61: Statement 9 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 10 (t[106] = 10.146, p < 0.001). 
Pair 62: Statement 9 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 11 (t[106] = 8.346, p < 0.001). 
Pair 63: Statement 9 was found to elicit significantly more certainty 
than statement 12 (t[106] = 10.877, p < 0.001). 
 
